Tradicionalni recepti

Paradižnik je zelenjava: to je zakon

Paradižnik je zelenjava: to je zakon

Starostnega spora še ni konec

Vsi to vemo paradižnik so tehnično sadje. Toda po vsem tem se izkaže, da čeprav so paradižniki tehnično sadje, pravno veljajo za a zelenjavna.

Razprava sega vsaj v devetnajsto stoletje, ko ni nič manj avtoriteta kot Vrhovno sodišče ZDA postavil vprašanje: "Ali je paradižnik sadje ali zelenjava?"

To vprašanje je bilo zastavljeno, potem ko je uvoznik sadja trdil, da je paradižnik sadje in ne zelenjava (za katero je veljala 10 -odstotna uvozna dajatev), zato je treba obdavčiti kot sadje (ki ni bilo obdavčeno).

Čeprav je vrhovno sodišče priznalo, da so paradižniki botanično tehnično plodovi-v botaniki se "sadje" preprosto nanaša na semensko strukturo katere koli cvetoče rastline-je bilo odločeno, da jih je treba obdavčiti kot zelenjavo na podlagi njihove najpogostejše kulinarike uporablja. Tako je tudi zato, ker so paradižnik (in ga še vedno) najpogosteje najdemo v solate, juhe, in sendviči raje kot torte, sladoledi, in sladice, so jih na koncu pravno gledali kot na zelenjavo in ne na sadje.

In to je to: po vseh teh letih, ko so se ljudje odločno trdili, da so paradižniki sadje, je prav imel prav vsak, ki je trdil nasprotno.

Za 15 najbolj okusnih receptov paradižnika iz dediščine kliknite tukaj.


John Nix je leta 1839 v New Yorku ustanovil komisijo za sadje John Nix & amp Co. Podjetje je postalo eden največjih prodajalcev pridelkov v New Yorku v tistem času in je bilo eno prvih podjetij, ki so pošiljala pridelke iz Virginije na Floridi. , z Bermudov pa v New York. [2]

Leta 1883 je predsednik Chester A. Arthur 3. marca 1883 podpisal tarifni zakon, ki zahteva plačilo davka na uvoženo zelenjavo, ne pa na sadje. Družba John Nix & amp Co. je vložila tožbo proti Edwardu L. Heddenu, zbiratelju pristanišča v New Yorku, za izterjavo za nazaj plačanih dajatev v protestih. Nasprotovali so tarifi, ko so poudarili, da je paradižnik botanično sadje zaradi svoje semenske strukture, ki raste iz cvetočega dela rastline. [3]

Zagovornik tožnikov je na sojenju v dokazno dokumentacijo opredelil besede "sadje" in "zelenjava" iz Websterjev slovar, Worcesterjev slovar, in Cesarski slovar. Poklicali sta dve priči, ki sta se 30 let ukvarjali s prodajo sadja in zelenjave, in ju po tem, ko sta slišali te opredelitve, prosili, naj povesta, ali imata ti besedi »kakšen poseben pomen v trgovini ali trgovini drugačen od branega«.

Med pričanjem je ena priča izpovedala, da glede definicije slovarja:

[slovar] tam ne uvršča vseh stvari, vendar so pravilne. Ne jemlje vseh vrst sadja ali zelenjave, vzame jih del. Mislim, da imata besedi "sadje" in "zelenjava" danes v trgovini enak pomen, kot sta ga imela 1. marca 1883. Razumem, da se izraz "sadje" v trgovini uporablja samo za tiste rastline ali dele rastlin, ki vsebujejo semena. Več je zelenjave kot tiste, ki je navedena v Websterjevem slovarju pod izrazom "zelenjava", kot so "zelje, cvetača, repa, krompir, grah, fižol in podobno", verjetno zajeto z besedami "in podobno"

Druga priča je pričala, da "mislim, da izraz" sadje "ali izraz" zelenjava "marca 1883 in prej nista imela nobenega posebnega pomena v trgovini in trgovini v tej državi, ki bi bil drugačen od tistega, ki sem ga tukaj prebral od slovarje. " [4]

Zagovornik tožnikov in zagovornik obdolženca sta uporabljala slovarje. Zagovornik tožnikov je v dokazih iz istih slovarjev prebral opredelitve besede paradižnik, zagovornik obdolženca pa nato v dokazih iz Websterjev slovar definicije besed grah, jajčevec, kumara, buča in poper. [5] V nasprotju s tem je tožeča stranka nato prebrala dokaze iz Websterjev in Worcester slovarji definicij krompirja, repe, pastinaka, cvetače, zelja, korenja in fižola.

Sodišče je soglasno odločilo v korist tožene stranke in ugotovilo, da je treba paradižnik v skladu s carinskimi predpisi razvrstiti kot zelenjavo, glede na načine njegove uporabe in priljubljeno dojemanje v ta namen. Sodnik Horace Gray je pri pisanju mnenja za Sodišče navedel:

Odlomki, navedeni v slovarjih, opredeljujejo besedo „sadje“ kot seme rastlin ali tisti del rastlin, ki vsebuje seme, predvsem pa sočne, mesnate izdelke nekaterih rastlin, ki pokrivajo in vsebujejo seme. Te opredelitve ne kažejo, da so paradižniki v splošnem govoru ali v smislu tarifnega akta „sadje“ za razliko od „zelenjave“.

Justice Grey, ki se sklicuje na več primerov vrhovnega sodišča (Brown proti Piper, 91 ZDA 37, 42 in Jones proti ZDA, 137 ZDA 202, 216) navaja, da mora sodišče, kadar besede v trgovini ali trgovini nimajo posebnega pomena, uporabiti običajen pomen. V tem primeru slovarjev ni mogoče sprejeti kot dokaze, ampak le kot pomoč pri spominu in razumevanju sodišča. Grey je priznal, da je paradižnik botanično razvrščen kot "sad vinske trte", vendar ga obravnavajo kot zelenjavo, ker so ga običajno jedli kot glavno jed namesto kot sladico. Pri odločitvi je sodnik Gray omenil še en primer, v katerem so trdili, da je fižol seme - sodnik Bradley, Robertson proti Salomonu, 130 ZDA 412, 414, podobno ugotovili, da čeprav je fižol botanično seme, je v običajnem govoru fižol viden kot zelenjava. Medtem ko je govoril o tej temi, je Gray pojasnil status kumar, buč, graha in fižola.

Nix je bil v treh odločbah vrhovnega sodišča naveden kot precedens za sodno razlago skupnih pomenov, zlasti slovarskih opredelitev. (Sonn proti Maggoneu, 159 ZDA 417 (1895) Saltonstall proti Wiebusch & amp Hilger, 156 ZDA 601 (1895) in Cadwalader proti Zehu, 151 ZDA 171 (1894)). Poleg tega v JSG Trading Corp. proti Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), primer, ki ni povezan z Nix Poleg skupne osredotočenosti na paradižnik je sodnik napisal naslednji odstavek in navedel primer:

V običajnem govoru je paradižnik zelenjava, kar je vrhovno sodišče že davno opazilo [glej Nix proti Heddenu 149 ZDA 304, 307, 13 S.Ct. 881, 882, 37 L. Ed. 745 (1893)], čeprav so botanično gledano dejansko plod. [26 Enciklopedija Americana 832 (Med. Izd. 1981)]. Ne glede na razvrstitev so ljudje že stoletja uživali v paradižniku, tudi gospod Pickwick, kot pripoveduje Dickens, je jedel njegove kotlete v "tomata" življenjski omaki.

Leta 2005 so navedli podporniki zakonodajnega telesa New Jerseyja Nix kot podlaga za predlog zakona, ki paradižnik označuje za uradno državno zelenjavo. [6]


John Nix je leta 1839 v New Yorku ustanovil komisijo za sadje John Nix & amp Co. Podjetje je postalo eden največjih prodajalcev pridelkov v New Yorku v tistem času in je bilo eno prvih podjetij, ki so pošiljala pridelke iz Virginije na Floridi. , z Bermudov pa v New York. [2]

Leta 1883 je predsednik Chester A. Arthur 3. marca 1883 podpisal tarifni zakon, ki zahteva plačilo davka na uvoženo zelenjavo, ne pa na sadje. Družba John Nix & amp Co. je vložila tožbo proti Edwardu L. Heddenu, zbiratelju pristanišča v New Yorku, za izterjavo za nazaj plačanih dajatev, protestiranih. Nasprotovali so tarifi, ko so poudarili, da je paradižnik botanično sadje zaradi svoje semenske strukture, ki raste iz cvetočega dela rastline. [3]

Zagovornik tožnikov je na sojenju v dokaze vnesel definicije besed "sadje" in "zelenjava" iz Websterjev slovar, Worcesterjev slovar, in Cesarski slovar. Poklicali sta dve priči, ki sta se 30 let ukvarjali s prodajo sadja in zelenjave, in ju po tem, ko sta slišali te opredelitve, prosili, naj povesta, ali imata ti besedi »kakšen poseben pomen v trgovini ali trgovini drugačen od branega«.

Med pričanjem je ena priča izpovedala, da glede definicije slovarja:

[slovar] tam ne uvršča vseh stvari, vendar so pravilne. Ne jemlje vseh vrst sadja ali zelenjave, vzame jih del. Mislim, da imata besedi "sadje" in "zelenjava" danes v trgovini enak pomen, kot sta ga imela 1. marca 1883. Razumem, da se izraz "sadje" v trgovini uporablja le za tiste rastline ali dele rastlin, ki vsebujejo semena. Več je zelenjave kot tiste, ki je navedena v Websterjevem slovarju pod izrazom "zelenjava", kot so "zelje, cvetača, repa, krompir, grah, fižol in podobno", verjetno zajeto z besedami "in podobno"

Druga priča je pričala, da "mislim, da izraz" sadje "ali izraz" zelenjava "marca 1883 in prej nista imela nobenega posebnega pomena v trgovini in trgovini v tej državi, ki bi bil drugačen od tistega, ki sem ga tukaj prebral od slovarje. " [4]

Zagovornik tožnikov in zagovornik obdolženca sta uporabila slovarje. Zagovornik tožnikov je v dokazih iz istih slovarjev prebral opredelitve besede paradižnik, zagovornik obdolženca pa nato v dokazih iz Websterjev slovar opredelitve besed grah, jajčevec, kumara, buča in poper. [5] V nasprotju s tem je tožeča stranka nato prebrala dokaze iz Websterjev in Worcesterjev slovarji definicij krompirja, repe, pastinaka, cvetače, zelja, korenja in fižola.

Sodišče je soglasno odločilo v korist tožene stranke in ugotovilo, da je treba paradižnik v skladu s carinskimi predpisi razvrstiti kot zelenjavo, glede na načine njegove uporabe in priljubljeno dojemanje v ta namen. Sodnik Horace Gray je pri pisanju mnenja za Sodišče navedel:

Odlomki, navedeni v slovarjih, opredeljujejo besedo „sadje“ kot seme rastlin ali tisti del rastlin, ki vsebuje seme, predvsem pa sočne, mesnate izdelke nekaterih rastlin, ki pokrivajo in vsebujejo seme. Te opredelitve ne kažejo, da so paradižniki v splošnem govoru ali v smislu tarifnega akta „sadje“ za razliko od „zelenjave“.

Justice Grey, ki se sklicuje na več primerov vrhovnega sodišča (Brown proti Piper, 91 ZDA 37, 42 in Jones proti ZDA, 137 ZDA 202, 216) navaja, da mora sodišče, kadar besede v trgovini ali trgovini nimajo posebnega pomena, uporabiti običajen pomen. V tem primeru slovarjev ni mogoče sprejeti kot dokaze, ampak le kot pomoč pri spominu in razumevanju sodišča. Grey je priznal, da je paradižnik botanično razvrščen kot "sad vinske trte", vendar ga obravnavajo kot zelenjavo, ker so ga običajno jedli kot glavno jed namesto kot sladico. Pri odločitvi je sodnik Gray omenil še en primer, v katerem so trdili, da je fižol seme - sodnik Bradley, Robertson proti Salomonu, 130 ZDA 412, 414, podobno ugotovili, da čeprav je fižol botanično seme, je v običajnem govoru fižol viden kot zelenjava. Medtem ko je govoril o tej temi, je Gray pojasnil status kumar, buč, graha in fižola.

Nix je bil v treh odločbah vrhovnega sodišča naveden kot precedens za sodno razlago skupnih pomenov, zlasti slovarskih opredelitev. (Sonn proti Maggoneu, 159 ZDA 417 (1895) Saltonstall proti Wiebusch & amp Hilger, 156 ZDA 601 (1895) in Cadwalader proti Zehu, 151 ZDA 171 (1894)). Poleg tega v JSG Trading Corp. proti Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), primer, ki ni povezan z Nix Poleg skupne osredotočenosti na paradižnik je sodnik napisal naslednji odstavek in navedel primer:

V običajnem jeziku je paradižnik zelenjava, kot je vrhovno sodišče že davno opazilo [glej Nix proti Heddenu 149 ZDA 304, 307, 13 S.Ct. 881, 882, 37 L. Ed. 745 (1893)], čeprav so botanično gledano dejansko plod. [26 Enciklopedija Americana 832 (Med. Izd. 1981)]. Ne glede na razvrstitev ljudje že stoletja uživajo v paradižniku, tudi gospod Pickwick, kot pravi Dickens, je jedel njegove kotlete v "tomata" življenjski omaki.

Leta 2005 so to navedli podporniki zakonodajnega telesa New Jerseyja Nix kot podlaga za predlog zakona, ki paradižnik označuje za uradno državno zelenjavo. [6]


John Nix je leta 1839 v New Yorku ustanovil komisijo za sadje John Nix & amp Co. Podjetje je postalo eden največjih prodajalcev pridelkov v New Yorku v tistem času in je bilo eno prvih podjetij, ki so pošiljala pridelke iz Virginije na Floridi. , z Bermudov pa v New York. [2]

Leta 1883 je predsednik Chester A. Arthur 3. marca 1883 podpisal tarifni zakon, ki zahteva plačilo davka na uvoženo zelenjavo, ne pa na sadje. Družba John Nix & amp Co. je vložila tožbo proti Edwardu L. Heddenu, zbiralcu pristanišča v New Yorku, za izterjavo za nazaj plačanih dajatev v protestih. Nasprotovali so tarifi, ko so poudarili, da je paradižnik botanično sadje zaradi svoje semenske strukture, ki raste iz cvetočega dela rastline. [3]

Zagovornik tožnikov je na sojenju v dokazno dokumentacijo opredelil besede "sadje" in "zelenjava" iz Websterjev slovar, Worcesterjev slovar, in Cesarski slovar. Poklicali sta dve priči, ki sta se 30 let ukvarjali s prodajo sadja in zelenjave, in ju po tem, ko sta slišali te opredelitve, prosili, naj povesta, ali imata ti besedi »kakšen poseben pomen v trgovini ali trgovini drugačen od branega«.

Med pričanjem je ena priča izpovedala, da glede definicije slovarja:

[slovar] tam ne uvršča vseh stvari, vendar so pravilne. Ne jemlje vseh vrst sadja ali zelenjave, vzame jih del. Mislim, da imata besedi "sadje" in "zelenjava" danes v trgovini enak pomen, kot sta ga imela 1. marca 1883. Razumem, da se izraz "sadje" v trgovini uporablja samo za tiste rastline ali dele rastlin, ki vsebujejo semena. Več je zelenjave kot tiste, ki je navedena v Websterjevem slovarju pod izrazom "zelenjava", kot so "zelje, cvetača, repa, krompir, grah, fižol in podobno", verjetno zajeto z besedami "in podobno"

Druga priča je pričala, da "mislim, da izraz" sadje "ali izraz" zelenjava "marca 1883 in prej nista imela nobenega posebnega pomena v trgovini in trgovini v tej državi, ki bi bil drugačen od tistega, ki sem ga tukaj prebral od slovarje. " [4]

Zagovornik tožnikov in zagovornik obdolženca sta uporabila slovarje. Zagovornik tožnikov je v dokazih iz istih slovarjev prebral opredelitve besede paradižnik, zagovornik obdolženca pa nato v dokazih iz Websterjev slovar definicije besed grah, jajčevec, kumara, buča in poper. [5] V nasprotju s tem je tožeča stranka nato prebrala dokaze iz Websterjev in Worcesterjev slovarji definicij krompirja, repe, pastinaka, cvetače, zelja, korenja in fižola.

Sodišče je soglasno odločilo v korist tožene stranke in ugotovilo, da je treba paradižnik v skladu s carinskimi predpisi razvrstiti kot zelenjavo, glede na načine njegove uporabe in priljubljeno dojemanje v ta namen. Sodnik Horace Gray je pri pisanju mnenja za Sodišče navedel:

Odlomki, navedeni v slovarjih, opredeljujejo besedo „sadje“ kot seme rastlin ali tisti del rastlin, ki vsebuje seme, predvsem pa sočne, mesnate izdelke nekaterih rastlin, ki pokrivajo in vsebujejo seme. Te opredelitve ne kažejo, da so paradižniki v splošnem govoru ali v smislu tarifnega akta „sadje“ za razliko od „zelenjave“.

Justice Grey, ki se sklicuje na več primerov vrhovnega sodišča (Brown proti Piper, 91 ZDA 37, 42 in Jones proti ZDA, 137 US 202, 216) navaja, da mora sodišče, ko besede v trgovini ali trgovini nimajo posebnega pomena, uporabiti običajen pomen. V tem primeru slovarjev ni mogoče sprejeti kot dokaze, ampak le kot pomoč pri spominu in razumevanju sodišča. Grey je priznal, da je paradižnik botanično razvrščen kot "sad vinske trte", kljub temu pa ga obravnavajo kot zelenjavo, ker so ga običajno jedli kot glavno jed, namesto kot sladico. Pri odločitvi je sodnik Gray omenil še en primer, v katerem so trdili, da je fižol seme - sodnik Bradley, Robertson proti Salomonu, 130 ZDA 412, 414, podobno ugotovili, da čeprav je fižol botanično seme, je v običajnem govoru fižol viden kot zelenjava. Medtem ko je obravnaval to temo, je Gray pojasnil status kumar, buč, graha in fižola.

Nix je bil v treh odločbah vrhovnega sodišča naveden kot precedens za sodno razlago skupnih pomenov, zlasti slovarskih opredelitev. (Sonn proti Maggoneu, 159 ZDA 417 (1895) Saltonstall proti Wiebusch & amp Hilger, 156 ZDA 601 (1895) in Cadwalader proti Zehu, 151 ZDA 171 (1894)). Poleg tega v JSG Trading Corp. proti Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), primer, ki ni povezan z Nix Poleg skupne osredotočenosti na paradižnik je sodnik napisal naslednji odstavek in navedel primer:

V običajnem govoru je paradižnik zelenjava, kar je vrhovno sodišče že davno opazilo [glej Nix proti Heddenu 149 ZDA 304, 307, 13 S.Ct. 881, 882, 37 L. Ed. 745 (1893)], čeprav so botanično gledano dejansko plod. [26 Ameriška enciklopedija 832 (Med. Izd. 1981)]. Ne glede na razvrstitev ljudje že stoletja uživajo v paradižniku, tudi gospod Pickwick, kot pravi Dickens, je jedel njegove kotlete v "tomata" življenjski omaki.

Leta 2005 so to navedli podporniki zakonodajnega telesa New Jerseyja Nix kot podlaga za predlog zakona, ki paradižnik označuje za uradno državno zelenjavo. [6]


John Nix je leta 1839 v New Yorku ustanovil komisijo za sadje John Nix & amp Co. Podjetje je postalo eden največjih prodajalcev pridelkov v New Yorku v tistem času in je bilo eno prvih podjetij, ki so pošiljala pridelke iz Virginije na Floridi. , z Bermudov pa v New York. [2]

Leta 1883 je predsednik Chester A. Arthur 3. marca 1883 podpisal tarifni zakon, ki zahteva plačilo davka na uvoženo zelenjavo, ne pa na sadje. Družba John Nix & amp Co. je vložila tožbo proti Edwardu L. Heddenu, zbiratelju pristanišča v New Yorku, za izterjavo za nazaj plačanih dajatev, protestiranih. Nasprotovali so tarifi, ko so poudarili, da je paradižnik botanično sadje zaradi svoje semenske strukture, ki raste iz cvetočega dela rastline. [3]

Zagovornik tožnikov je na sojenju v dokazno dokumentacijo opredelil besede "sadje" in "zelenjava" iz Websterjev slovar, Worcesterjev slovar, in Cesarski slovar. Poklicali sta dve priči, ki sta se 30 let ukvarjali s prodajo sadja in zelenjave, in ju po tem, ko sta slišali te opredelitve, prosili, naj povesta, ali imata ti besedi »kakšen poseben pomen v trgovini ali trgovini drugačen od branega«.

Med pričanjem je ena priča izpovedala, da glede definicije slovarja:

[slovar] tam ne uvršča vseh stvari, vendar so pravilne. Ne jemlje vseh vrst sadja ali zelenjave, vzame jih del. Mislim, da imata besedi "sadje" in "zelenjava" danes v trgovini enak pomen, kot sta ga imela 1. marca 1883. Razumem, da se izraz "sadje" v trgovini uporablja samo za tiste rastline ali dele rastlin, ki vsebujejo semena. Več je zelenjave kot tiste, ki je navedena v Websterjevem slovarju pod izrazom "zelenjava", kot so "zelje, cvetača, repa, krompir, grah, fižol in podobno", verjetno zajeto z besedami "in podobno"

Druga priča je pričala, da "mislim, da izraz" sadje "ali izraz" zelenjava "marca 1883 in prej nista imela nobenega posebnega pomena v trgovini in trgovini v tej državi, ki bi bil drugačen od tistega, ki sem ga tukaj prebral od slovarje. " [4]

Zagovornik tožnikov in zagovornik obdolženca sta uporabila slovarje. Zagovornik tožnikov je v dokazih iz istih slovarjev prebral opredelitve besede paradižnik, zagovornik obdolženca pa nato v dokazih iz Websterjev slovar opredelitve besed grah, jajčevec, kumara, buča in poper. [5] V nasprotju s tem je tožeča stranka nato prebrala dokaze iz Websterjev in Worcester slovarji definicij krompirja, repe, pastinaka, cvetače, zelja, korenja in fižola.

Sodišče je soglasno odločilo v korist tožene stranke in ugotovilo, da je treba paradižnik v skladu s carinskimi predpisi razvrstiti kot zelenjavo, glede na načine njegove uporabe in priljubljeno dojemanje v ta namen. Sodnik Horace Gray je pri pisanju mnenja za Sodišče navedel:

Odlomki, navedeni v slovarjih, opredeljujejo besedo „sadje“ kot seme rastlin ali tisti del rastlin, ki vsebuje seme, predvsem pa sočne, mesnate izdelke nekaterih rastlin, ki pokrivajo in vsebujejo seme. Te opredelitve ne kažejo, da so paradižniki v splošnem govoru ali v smislu tarifnega akta „sadje“ za razliko od „zelenjave“.

Justice Grey, ki se sklicuje na več primerov vrhovnega sodišča (Brown proti Piper, 91 ZDA 37, 42 in Jones proti ZDA, 137 ZDA 202, 216) navaja, da mora sodišče, kadar besede v trgovini ali trgovini nimajo posebnega pomena, uporabiti običajen pomen. V tem primeru slovarjev ni mogoče sprejeti kot dokaze, ampak le kot pomoč pri spominu in razumevanju sodišča. Grey je priznal, da je paradižnik botanično razvrščen kot "sad vinske trte", vendar ga obravnavajo kot zelenjavo, ker so ga običajno jedli kot glavno jed namesto kot sladico. Pri odločitvi je sodnik Gray omenil še en primer, v katerem so trdili, da je fižol seme - sodnik Bradley, Robertson proti Salomonu, 130 ZDA 412, 414, podobno ugotovili, da čeprav je fižol botanično seme, je v običajnem govoru fižol viden kot zelenjava. Medtem ko je obravnaval to temo, je Gray pojasnil status kumar, buč, graha in fižola.

Nix je bil v treh odločbah vrhovnega sodišča naveden kot precedens za sodno razlago skupnih pomenov, zlasti slovarskih opredelitev. (Sonn proti Maggoneu, 159 ZDA 417 (1895) Saltonstall proti Wiebusch & amp Hilger, 156 ZDA 601 (1895) in Cadwalader proti Zehu, 151 ZDA 171 (1894)). Poleg tega v JSG Trading Corp. proti Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), primer, ki ni povezan z Nix Poleg skupne osredotočenosti na paradižnik je sodnik napisal naslednji odstavek in navedel primer:

V običajnem jeziku je paradižnik zelenjava, kot je vrhovno sodišče že davno opazilo [glej Nix proti Heddenu 149 ZDA 304, 307, 13 S.Ct. 881, 882, 37 L. Ed. 745 (1893)], čeprav so botanično gledano dejansko sadje. [26 Enciklopedija Americana 832 (Med. Izd. 1981)]. Ne glede na razvrstitev ljudje že stoletja uživajo v paradižniku, tudi gospod Pickwick, kot pravi Dickens, je jedel njegove kotlete v "tomata" življenjski omaki.

Leta 2005 so to navedli podporniki zakonodajnega telesa New Jerseyja Nix kot podlaga za predlog zakona, ki paradižnik označuje za uradno državno zelenjavo. [6]


John Nix je leta 1839 v New Yorku ustanovil komisijo za sadje John Nix & amp Co. Podjetje je postalo eden največjih prodajalcev pridelkov v New Yorku v tistem času in je bilo eno prvih podjetij, ki so pošiljala pridelke iz Virginije na Floridi. , z Bermudov pa v New York. [2]

Leta 1883 je predsednik Chester A. Arthur 3. marca 1883 podpisal tarifni zakon, ki zahteva plačilo davka na uvoženo zelenjavo, ne pa na sadje. Družba John Nix & amp Co. je vložila tožbo proti Edwardu L. Heddenu, zbiralcu pristanišča v New Yorku, za izterjavo za nazaj plačanih dajatev v protestih. Nasprotovali so tarifi, ko so poudarili, da je paradižnik botanično sadje zaradi svoje semenske strukture, ki raste iz cvetočega dela rastline. [3]

Zagovornik tožnikov je na sojenju v dokazno dokumentacijo opredelil besede "sadje" in "zelenjava" iz Websterjev slovar, Worcesterjev slovar, in Cesarski slovar. Poklicali sta dve priči, ki sta se 30 let ukvarjali s prodajo sadja in zelenjave, in ju po tem, ko sta slišali te opredelitve, prosili, naj povesta, ali imata ti besedi »kakšen poseben pomen v trgovini ali trgovini drugačen od branega«.

Med pričanjem je ena priča izpovedala, da glede definicije slovarja:

[slovar] tam ne uvršča vseh stvari, vendar so pravilne. Ne jemlje vseh vrst sadja ali zelenjave, vzame jih del. Mislim, da imata besedi "sadje" in "zelenjava" danes v trgovini enak pomen, kot sta ga imela 1. marca 1883. Razumem, da se izraz "sadje" v trgovini uporablja le za tiste rastline ali dele rastlin, ki vsebujejo semena. Več je zelenjave kot tiste, ki je navedena v Websterjevem slovarju pod izrazom "zelenjava", kot so "zelje, cvetača, repa, krompir, grah, fižol in podobno", verjetno zajeto z besedami "in podobno"

Druga priča je pričala, da "mislim, da izraz" sadje "ali izraz" zelenjava "marca 1883 in prej nista imela posebnega pomena v trgovini in trgovini v tej državi, ki bi bil drugačen od tistega, ki sem ga tukaj prebral od slovarje. " [4]

Zagovornik tožnikov in zagovornik obdolženca sta uporabljala slovarje. Zagovornik tožnikov je v dokazih iz istih slovarjev prebral opredelitve besede paradižnik, zagovornik obdolženca pa nato v dokazih iz Websterjev slovar definicije besed grah, jajčevec, kumara, buča in poper. [5] V nasprotju s tem je tožeča stranka nato prebrala dokaze iz Websterjev in Worcesterjev slovarji definicij krompirja, repe, pastinaka, cvetače, zelja, korenja in fižola.

Sodišče je soglasno odločilo v korist tožene stranke in ugotovilo, da je treba paradižnik v skladu s carinskimi predpisi razvrstiti kot zelenjavo, glede na načine njegove uporabe in priljubljeno dojemanje v ta namen. Sodnik Horace Gray je pri pisanju mnenja za Sodišče navedel:

Odlomki, navedeni v slovarjih, opredeljujejo besedo „sadje“ kot seme rastlin ali tisti del rastlin, ki vsebuje seme, predvsem pa sočne, mesnate izdelke nekaterih rastlin, ki pokrivajo in vsebujejo seme. Te opredelitve ne kažejo, da so paradižniki v splošnem govoru ali v smislu tarifnega akta „sadje“ za razliko od „zelenjave“.

Justice Grey, ki se sklicuje na več primerov vrhovnega sodišča (Brown proti Piper, 91 ZDA 37, 42 in Jones proti ZDA, 137 US 202, 216) navaja, da mora sodišče, ko besede v trgovini ali trgovini nimajo posebnega pomena, uporabiti običajen pomen. V tem primeru slovarjev ni mogoče sprejeti kot dokaze, ampak le kot pomoč pri spominu in razumevanju sodišča. Grey je priznal, da je paradižnik botanično razvrščen kot "sad vinske trte", kljub temu pa ga obravnavajo kot zelenjavo, ker so ga običajno jedli kot glavno jed, namesto kot sladico. Pri odločitvi je sodnik Gray omenil še en primer, v katerem so trdili, da je fižol seme - sodnik Bradley, Robertson proti Salomonu, 130 ZDA 412, 414, podobno ugotovili, da čeprav je fižol botanično seme, je v običajnem govoru fižol viden kot zelenjava. Medtem ko je obravnaval to temo, je Gray pojasnil status kumar, buč, graha in fižola.

Nix je bil v treh odločbah vrhovnega sodišča naveden kot precedens za sodno razlago skupnih pomenov, zlasti slovarskih opredelitev. (Sonn proti Maggoneu, 159 ZDA 417 (1895) Saltonstall proti Wiebusch & amp Hilger, 156 ZDA 601 (1895) in Cadwalader proti Zehu, 151 ZDA 171 (1894)). Poleg tega v JSG Trading Corp. proti Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), primer, ki ni povezan z Nix Poleg skupne osredotočenosti na paradižnik je sodnik napisal naslednji odstavek in navedel primer:

V običajnem jeziku je paradižnik zelenjava, kot je vrhovno sodišče že davno opazilo [glej Nix proti Heddenu 149 ZDA 304, 307, 13 S.Ct. 881, 882, 37 L. Ed. 745 (1893)], čeprav so botanično gledano dejansko plod. [26 Enciklopedija Americana 832 (Med. Izd. 1981)]. Ne glede na razvrstitev ljudje že stoletja uživajo v paradižniku, tudi gospod Pickwick, kot pravi Dickens, je jedel njegove kotlete v "tomata" življenjski omaki.

Leta 2005 so to navedli podporniki zakonodajnega telesa New Jerseyja Nix kot podlaga za predlog zakona, ki paradižnik označuje za uradno državno zelenjavo. [6]


John Nix je leta 1839 v New Yorku ustanovil komisijo za sadje John Nix & amp Co. Podjetje je postalo eden največjih prodajalcev pridelkov v New Yorku v tistem času in je bilo eno prvih podjetij, ki so pošiljala pridelke iz Virginije na Floridi. , z Bermudov pa v New York. [2]

Leta 1883 je predsednik Chester A. Arthur 3. marca 1883 podpisal tarifni zakon, ki zahteva plačilo davka na uvoženo zelenjavo, ne pa na sadje. Družba John Nix & amp Co. je vložila tožbo proti Edwardu L. Heddenu, zbiratelju pristanišča v New Yorku, za izterjavo za nazaj plačanih dajatev, protestiranih. Nasprotovali so tarifi, ko so poudarili, da je paradižnik botanično sadje zaradi svoje semenske strukture, ki raste iz cvetočega dela rastline. [3]

Zagovornik tožnikov je na sojenju v dokaze vnesel definicije besed "sadje" in "zelenjava" iz Websterjev slovar, Worcesterjev slovar, in Cesarski slovar. Poklicali sta dve priči, ki sta se 30 let ukvarjali s prodajo sadja in zelenjave, in ju po tem, ko sta slišali te opredelitve, prosili, naj povesta, ali imata ti besedi »kakšen poseben pomen v trgovini ali trgovini drugačen od branega«.

Med pričanjem je ena priča izpovedala, da glede definicije slovarja:

[slovar] tam ne uvršča vseh stvari, vendar so pravilne. Ne jemlje vseh vrst sadja ali zelenjave, vzame jih del. Mislim, da imata besedi "sadje" in "zelenjava" danes v trgovini enak pomen, kot sta ga imela 1. marca 1883. Razumem, da se izraz "sadje" v trgovini uporablja samo za tiste rastline ali dele rastlin, ki vsebujejo semena. Več je zelenjave kot tiste, ki je navedena v Websterjevem slovarju pod izrazom "zelenjava", kot so "zelje, cvetača, repa, krompir, grah, fižol in podobno", verjetno zajeto z besedami "in podobno"

Druga priča je pričala, da "mislim, da izraz" sadje "ali izraz" zelenjava "marca 1883 in prej nista imela nobenega posebnega pomena v trgovini in trgovini v tej državi, ki bi bil drugačen od tistega, ki sem ga tukaj prebral od slovarje. " [4]

Zagovornik tožnikov in zagovornik obdolženca sta uporabila slovarje. Zagovornik tožnikov je v dokazih iz istih slovarjev prebral opredelitve besede paradižnik, zagovornik obdolženca pa nato v dokazih iz Websterjev slovar definicije besed grah, jajčevec, kumara, buča in poper. [5] V nasprotju s tem je tožeča stranka nato prebrala dokaze iz Websterjev in Worcester slovarji definicij krompirja, repe, pastinaka, cvetače, zelja, korenja in fižola.

The court unanimously decided in favor of the respondent and found that the tomato should be classified under the customs regulations as a vegetable, based on the ways in which it is used, and the popular perception to this end. Justice Horace Gray, writing the opinion for the Court, stated that:

The passages cited from the dictionaries define the word 'fruit' as the seed of plants, or that part of plants which contains the seed, and especially the juicy, pulpy products of certain plants, covering and containing the seed. These definitions have no tendency to show that tomatoes are 'fruit,' as distinguished from 'vegetables,' in common speech, or within the meaning of the tariff act.

Justice Gray, citing several Supreme Court cases (Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 42, and Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 216) stated that when words have acquired no special meaning in trade or commerce, the ordinary meaning must be used by the court. In this case dictionaries cannot be admitted as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court. Gray acknowledged that botanically, tomatoes are classified as a "fruit of the vine" nevertheless, they are seen as vegetables because they were usually eaten as a main course instead of being eaten as a dessert. In making his decision, Justice Gray mentioned another case where it had been claimed that beans were seeds — Justice Bradley, in Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U.S. 412, 414, similarly found that though a bean is botanically a seed, in common parlance a bean is seen as a vegetable. While on the subject, Gray clarified the status of the cucumber, squash, pea, and bean.

Nix has been cited in three Supreme Court decisions as a precedent for court interpretation of common meanings, especially dictionary definitions. (Sonn v. Maggone, 159 U.S. 417 (1895) Saltonstall v. Wiebusch & Hilger, 156 U.S. 601 (1895) and Cadwalader v. Zeh, 151 U.S. 171 (1894)). Additionally, in JSG Trading Corp. v. Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), a case unrelated to Nix aside from the shared focus on tomatoes, a judge wrote the following paragraph citing the case:

In common parlance tomatoes are vegetables, as the Supreme Court observed long ago [see Nix v. Hedden 149 U.S. 304, 307, 13 S.Ct. 881, 882, 37 L.Ed. 745 (1893)], although botanically speaking they are actually a fruit. [26 Encyclopedia Americana 832 (Int'l. ed. 1981)]. Regardless of classification, people have been enjoying tomatoes for centuries even Mr. Pickwick, as Dickens relates, ate his chops in "tomata" life sauce.

In 2005, supporters in the New Jersey legislature cited Nix as a basis for a bill designating the tomato as the official state vegetable. [6]


John Nix founded the John Nix & Co. fruit commission in New York City in 1839. The company became one of the largest sellers of produce in New York City at the time, and was one of the first companies to ship produce from Virginia, Florida, and Bermuda to New York. [2]

In 1883, President Chester A. Arthur signed the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, requiring a tax to be paid on imported vegetables, but not fruit. The John Nix & Co. company filed a suit against Edward L. Hedden, Collector of the Port of New York, to recover back duties paid under protest. They argued against the tariff by pointing out that, botanically, a tomato is a fruit due to its seed-bearing structure growing from the flowering part of a plant. [3]

At the trial, the plaintiffs' counsel entered into evidence definitions of the words "fruit" and "vegetables" from Webster's Dictionary, Worcester's Dictionary, in Imperial Dictionary. They called two witnesses, who had been in the business of selling fruit and vegetables for 30 years, and asked them, after hearing these definitions, to say whether these words had "any special meaning in trade or commerce, different from those read."

During testimony, one witness testified that in regard to the dictionary definition:

[the dictionary] does not classify all things there, but they are correct as far as they go. It does not take all kinds of fruit or vegetables it takes a portion of them. I think the words 'fruit' and 'vegetable' have the same meaning in trade today that they had on March 1, 1883. I understand that the term 'fruit' is applied in trade only to such plants or parts of plants as contain the seeds. There are more vegetables than those in the enumeration given in Webster's Dictionary under the term 'vegetable,' as 'cabbage, cauliflower, turnips, potatoes, peas, beans, and the like,' probably covered by the words 'and the like'

Another witness testified that "I don't think the term 'fruit' or the term 'vegetables' had, in March 1883, and prior thereto, any special meaning in trade and commerce in this country different from that which I have read here from the dictionaries." [4]

Both the plaintiffs' counsel and the defendant's counsel made use of the dictionaries. The plaintiffs' counsel read in evidence from the same dictionaries the definitions of the word tomato, while the defendant's counsel then read in evidence from Webster's Dictionary the definitions of the words pea, eggplant, cucumber, squash, and pepper. [5] Countering this, the plaintiff then read in evidence from Webster's in Worcester's dictionaries the definitions of potato, turnip, parsnip, cauliflower, cabbage, carrot and bean.

The court unanimously decided in favor of the respondent and found that the tomato should be classified under the customs regulations as a vegetable, based on the ways in which it is used, and the popular perception to this end. Justice Horace Gray, writing the opinion for the Court, stated that:

The passages cited from the dictionaries define the word 'fruit' as the seed of plants, or that part of plants which contains the seed, and especially the juicy, pulpy products of certain plants, covering and containing the seed. These definitions have no tendency to show that tomatoes are 'fruit,' as distinguished from 'vegetables,' in common speech, or within the meaning of the tariff act.

Justice Gray, citing several Supreme Court cases (Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 42, and Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 216) stated that when words have acquired no special meaning in trade or commerce, the ordinary meaning must be used by the court. In this case dictionaries cannot be admitted as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court. Gray acknowledged that botanically, tomatoes are classified as a "fruit of the vine" nevertheless, they are seen as vegetables because they were usually eaten as a main course instead of being eaten as a dessert. In making his decision, Justice Gray mentioned another case where it had been claimed that beans were seeds — Justice Bradley, in Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U.S. 412, 414, similarly found that though a bean is botanically a seed, in common parlance a bean is seen as a vegetable. While on the subject, Gray clarified the status of the cucumber, squash, pea, and bean.

Nix has been cited in three Supreme Court decisions as a precedent for court interpretation of common meanings, especially dictionary definitions. (Sonn v. Maggone, 159 U.S. 417 (1895) Saltonstall v. Wiebusch & Hilger, 156 U.S. 601 (1895) and Cadwalader v. Zeh, 151 U.S. 171 (1894)). Additionally, in JSG Trading Corp. v. Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), a case unrelated to Nix aside from the shared focus on tomatoes, a judge wrote the following paragraph citing the case:

In common parlance tomatoes are vegetables, as the Supreme Court observed long ago [see Nix v. Hedden 149 U.S. 304, 307, 13 S.Ct. 881, 882, 37 L.Ed. 745 (1893)], although botanically speaking they are actually a fruit. [26 Encyclopedia Americana 832 (Int'l. ed. 1981)]. Regardless of classification, people have been enjoying tomatoes for centuries even Mr. Pickwick, as Dickens relates, ate his chops in "tomata" life sauce.

In 2005, supporters in the New Jersey legislature cited Nix as a basis for a bill designating the tomato as the official state vegetable. [6]


John Nix founded the John Nix & Co. fruit commission in New York City in 1839. The company became one of the largest sellers of produce in New York City at the time, and was one of the first companies to ship produce from Virginia, Florida, and Bermuda to New York. [2]

In 1883, President Chester A. Arthur signed the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, requiring a tax to be paid on imported vegetables, but not fruit. The John Nix & Co. company filed a suit against Edward L. Hedden, Collector of the Port of New York, to recover back duties paid under protest. They argued against the tariff by pointing out that, botanically, a tomato is a fruit due to its seed-bearing structure growing from the flowering part of a plant. [3]

At the trial, the plaintiffs' counsel entered into evidence definitions of the words "fruit" and "vegetables" from Webster's Dictionary, Worcester's Dictionary, in Imperial Dictionary. They called two witnesses, who had been in the business of selling fruit and vegetables for 30 years, and asked them, after hearing these definitions, to say whether these words had "any special meaning in trade or commerce, different from those read."

During testimony, one witness testified that in regard to the dictionary definition:

[the dictionary] does not classify all things there, but they are correct as far as they go. It does not take all kinds of fruit or vegetables it takes a portion of them. I think the words 'fruit' and 'vegetable' have the same meaning in trade today that they had on March 1, 1883. I understand that the term 'fruit' is applied in trade only to such plants or parts of plants as contain the seeds. There are more vegetables than those in the enumeration given in Webster's Dictionary under the term 'vegetable,' as 'cabbage, cauliflower, turnips, potatoes, peas, beans, and the like,' probably covered by the words 'and the like'

Another witness testified that "I don't think the term 'fruit' or the term 'vegetables' had, in March 1883, and prior thereto, any special meaning in trade and commerce in this country different from that which I have read here from the dictionaries." [4]

Both the plaintiffs' counsel and the defendant's counsel made use of the dictionaries. The plaintiffs' counsel read in evidence from the same dictionaries the definitions of the word tomato, while the defendant's counsel then read in evidence from Webster's Dictionary the definitions of the words pea, eggplant, cucumber, squash, and pepper. [5] Countering this, the plaintiff then read in evidence from Webster's in Worcester's dictionaries the definitions of potato, turnip, parsnip, cauliflower, cabbage, carrot and bean.

The court unanimously decided in favor of the respondent and found that the tomato should be classified under the customs regulations as a vegetable, based on the ways in which it is used, and the popular perception to this end. Justice Horace Gray, writing the opinion for the Court, stated that:

The passages cited from the dictionaries define the word 'fruit' as the seed of plants, or that part of plants which contains the seed, and especially the juicy, pulpy products of certain plants, covering and containing the seed. These definitions have no tendency to show that tomatoes are 'fruit,' as distinguished from 'vegetables,' in common speech, or within the meaning of the tariff act.

Justice Gray, citing several Supreme Court cases (Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 42, and Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 216) stated that when words have acquired no special meaning in trade or commerce, the ordinary meaning must be used by the court. In this case dictionaries cannot be admitted as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court. Gray acknowledged that botanically, tomatoes are classified as a "fruit of the vine" nevertheless, they are seen as vegetables because they were usually eaten as a main course instead of being eaten as a dessert. In making his decision, Justice Gray mentioned another case where it had been claimed that beans were seeds — Justice Bradley, in Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U.S. 412, 414, similarly found that though a bean is botanically a seed, in common parlance a bean is seen as a vegetable. While on the subject, Gray clarified the status of the cucumber, squash, pea, and bean.

Nix has been cited in three Supreme Court decisions as a precedent for court interpretation of common meanings, especially dictionary definitions. (Sonn v. Maggone, 159 U.S. 417 (1895) Saltonstall v. Wiebusch & Hilger, 156 U.S. 601 (1895) and Cadwalader v. Zeh, 151 U.S. 171 (1894)). Additionally, in JSG Trading Corp. v. Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), a case unrelated to Nix aside from the shared focus on tomatoes, a judge wrote the following paragraph citing the case:

In common parlance tomatoes are vegetables, as the Supreme Court observed long ago [see Nix v. Hedden 149 U.S. 304, 307, 13 S.Ct. 881, 882, 37 L.Ed. 745 (1893)], although botanically speaking they are actually a fruit. [26 Encyclopedia Americana 832 (Int'l. ed. 1981)]. Regardless of classification, people have been enjoying tomatoes for centuries even Mr. Pickwick, as Dickens relates, ate his chops in "tomata" life sauce.

In 2005, supporters in the New Jersey legislature cited Nix as a basis for a bill designating the tomato as the official state vegetable. [6]


John Nix founded the John Nix & Co. fruit commission in New York City in 1839. The company became one of the largest sellers of produce in New York City at the time, and was one of the first companies to ship produce from Virginia, Florida, and Bermuda to New York. [2]

In 1883, President Chester A. Arthur signed the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, requiring a tax to be paid on imported vegetables, but not fruit. The John Nix & Co. company filed a suit against Edward L. Hedden, Collector of the Port of New York, to recover back duties paid under protest. They argued against the tariff by pointing out that, botanically, a tomato is a fruit due to its seed-bearing structure growing from the flowering part of a plant. [3]

At the trial, the plaintiffs' counsel entered into evidence definitions of the words "fruit" and "vegetables" from Webster's Dictionary, Worcester's Dictionary, in Imperial Dictionary. They called two witnesses, who had been in the business of selling fruit and vegetables for 30 years, and asked them, after hearing these definitions, to say whether these words had "any special meaning in trade or commerce, different from those read."

During testimony, one witness testified that in regard to the dictionary definition:

[the dictionary] does not classify all things there, but they are correct as far as they go. It does not take all kinds of fruit or vegetables it takes a portion of them. I think the words 'fruit' and 'vegetable' have the same meaning in trade today that they had on March 1, 1883. I understand that the term 'fruit' is applied in trade only to such plants or parts of plants as contain the seeds. There are more vegetables than those in the enumeration given in Webster's Dictionary under the term 'vegetable,' as 'cabbage, cauliflower, turnips, potatoes, peas, beans, and the like,' probably covered by the words 'and the like'

Another witness testified that "I don't think the term 'fruit' or the term 'vegetables' had, in March 1883, and prior thereto, any special meaning in trade and commerce in this country different from that which I have read here from the dictionaries." [4]

Both the plaintiffs' counsel and the defendant's counsel made use of the dictionaries. The plaintiffs' counsel read in evidence from the same dictionaries the definitions of the word tomato, while the defendant's counsel then read in evidence from Webster's Dictionary the definitions of the words pea, eggplant, cucumber, squash, and pepper. [5] Countering this, the plaintiff then read in evidence from Webster's in Worcester's dictionaries the definitions of potato, turnip, parsnip, cauliflower, cabbage, carrot and bean.

The court unanimously decided in favor of the respondent and found that the tomato should be classified under the customs regulations as a vegetable, based on the ways in which it is used, and the popular perception to this end. Justice Horace Gray, writing the opinion for the Court, stated that:

The passages cited from the dictionaries define the word 'fruit' as the seed of plants, or that part of plants which contains the seed, and especially the juicy, pulpy products of certain plants, covering and containing the seed. These definitions have no tendency to show that tomatoes are 'fruit,' as distinguished from 'vegetables,' in common speech, or within the meaning of the tariff act.

Justice Gray, citing several Supreme Court cases (Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 42, and Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 216) stated that when words have acquired no special meaning in trade or commerce, the ordinary meaning must be used by the court. In this case dictionaries cannot be admitted as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court. Gray acknowledged that botanically, tomatoes are classified as a "fruit of the vine" nevertheless, they are seen as vegetables because they were usually eaten as a main course instead of being eaten as a dessert. In making his decision, Justice Gray mentioned another case where it had been claimed that beans were seeds — Justice Bradley, in Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U.S. 412, 414, similarly found that though a bean is botanically a seed, in common parlance a bean is seen as a vegetable. While on the subject, Gray clarified the status of the cucumber, squash, pea, and bean.

Nix has been cited in three Supreme Court decisions as a precedent for court interpretation of common meanings, especially dictionary definitions. (Sonn v. Maggone, 159 U.S. 417 (1895) Saltonstall v. Wiebusch & Hilger, 156 U.S. 601 (1895) and Cadwalader v. Zeh, 151 U.S. 171 (1894)). Additionally, in JSG Trading Corp. v. Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), a case unrelated to Nix aside from the shared focus on tomatoes, a judge wrote the following paragraph citing the case:

In common parlance tomatoes are vegetables, as the Supreme Court observed long ago [see Nix v. Hedden 149 U.S. 304, 307, 13 S.Ct. 881, 882, 37 L.Ed. 745 (1893)], although botanically speaking they are actually a fruit. [26 Encyclopedia Americana 832 (Int'l. ed. 1981)]. Regardless of classification, people have been enjoying tomatoes for centuries even Mr. Pickwick, as Dickens relates, ate his chops in "tomata" life sauce.

In 2005, supporters in the New Jersey legislature cited Nix as a basis for a bill designating the tomato as the official state vegetable. [6]


John Nix founded the John Nix & Co. fruit commission in New York City in 1839. The company became one of the largest sellers of produce in New York City at the time, and was one of the first companies to ship produce from Virginia, Florida, and Bermuda to New York. [2]

In 1883, President Chester A. Arthur signed the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, requiring a tax to be paid on imported vegetables, but not fruit. The John Nix & Co. company filed a suit against Edward L. Hedden, Collector of the Port of New York, to recover back duties paid under protest. They argued against the tariff by pointing out that, botanically, a tomato is a fruit due to its seed-bearing structure growing from the flowering part of a plant. [3]

At the trial, the plaintiffs' counsel entered into evidence definitions of the words "fruit" and "vegetables" from Webster's Dictionary, Worcester's Dictionary, in Imperial Dictionary. They called two witnesses, who had been in the business of selling fruit and vegetables for 30 years, and asked them, after hearing these definitions, to say whether these words had "any special meaning in trade or commerce, different from those read."

During testimony, one witness testified that in regard to the dictionary definition:

[the dictionary] does not classify all things there, but they are correct as far as they go. It does not take all kinds of fruit or vegetables it takes a portion of them. I think the words 'fruit' and 'vegetable' have the same meaning in trade today that they had on March 1, 1883. I understand that the term 'fruit' is applied in trade only to such plants or parts of plants as contain the seeds. There are more vegetables than those in the enumeration given in Webster's Dictionary under the term 'vegetable,' as 'cabbage, cauliflower, turnips, potatoes, peas, beans, and the like,' probably covered by the words 'and the like'

Another witness testified that "I don't think the term 'fruit' or the term 'vegetables' had, in March 1883, and prior thereto, any special meaning in trade and commerce in this country different from that which I have read here from the dictionaries." [4]

Both the plaintiffs' counsel and the defendant's counsel made use of the dictionaries. The plaintiffs' counsel read in evidence from the same dictionaries the definitions of the word tomato, while the defendant's counsel then read in evidence from Webster's Dictionary the definitions of the words pea, eggplant, cucumber, squash, and pepper. [5] Countering this, the plaintiff then read in evidence from Webster's in Worcester's dictionaries the definitions of potato, turnip, parsnip, cauliflower, cabbage, carrot and bean.

The court unanimously decided in favor of the respondent and found that the tomato should be classified under the customs regulations as a vegetable, based on the ways in which it is used, and the popular perception to this end. Justice Horace Gray, writing the opinion for the Court, stated that:

The passages cited from the dictionaries define the word 'fruit' as the seed of plants, or that part of plants which contains the seed, and especially the juicy, pulpy products of certain plants, covering and containing the seed. These definitions have no tendency to show that tomatoes are 'fruit,' as distinguished from 'vegetables,' in common speech, or within the meaning of the tariff act.

Justice Gray, citing several Supreme Court cases (Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 42, and Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 216) stated that when words have acquired no special meaning in trade or commerce, the ordinary meaning must be used by the court. In this case dictionaries cannot be admitted as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court. Gray acknowledged that botanically, tomatoes are classified as a "fruit of the vine" nevertheless, they are seen as vegetables because they were usually eaten as a main course instead of being eaten as a dessert. In making his decision, Justice Gray mentioned another case where it had been claimed that beans were seeds — Justice Bradley, in Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U.S. 412, 414, similarly found that though a bean is botanically a seed, in common parlance a bean is seen as a vegetable. While on the subject, Gray clarified the status of the cucumber, squash, pea, and bean.

Nix has been cited in three Supreme Court decisions as a precedent for court interpretation of common meanings, especially dictionary definitions. (Sonn v. Maggone, 159 U.S. 417 (1895) Saltonstall v. Wiebusch & Hilger, 156 U.S. 601 (1895) and Cadwalader v. Zeh, 151 U.S. 171 (1894)). Additionally, in JSG Trading Corp. v. Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), a case unrelated to Nix aside from the shared focus on tomatoes, a judge wrote the following paragraph citing the case:

In common parlance tomatoes are vegetables, as the Supreme Court observed long ago [see Nix v. Hedden 149 U.S. 304, 307, 13 S.Ct. 881, 882, 37 L.Ed. 745 (1893)], although botanically speaking they are actually a fruit. [26 Encyclopedia Americana 832 (Int'l. ed. 1981)]. Regardless of classification, people have been enjoying tomatoes for centuries even Mr. Pickwick, as Dickens relates, ate his chops in "tomata" life sauce.

In 2005, supporters in the New Jersey legislature cited Nix as a basis for a bill designating the tomato as the official state vegetable. [6]


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